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artin Wolf offers an excellent analysis of how the Greek voter may feel about 
Sunday’s referendum.1 There is no good option: either be engulfed in the chaos 
following the rejection of the programme, exit and collapse of the economy or accept 
another programme. 
On one account, however, Mr Wolf’s gentle optimism may be disappointed. He suggests that 
the cost of exiting might be temporary and offset by the benefits of the ensuing devaluation in 
terms of increased competitiveness and exports. This is indeed what one would expect from a 
small open economy, where the export sector is important and benefits from lower domestic 
costs.  
Unfortunately, Greece is a rare case of a small quasi-closed economy. Exports now account for 
about 30% of GDP, but a large part of this consists of oil and global maritime transportation 
services. Since Greece is not an oil producer, oil exports are in reality just re-exports with little 
domestic added value. Similarly global maritime services do not employ Greek sailors and 
also have no connection with the domestic economy. This means that the part of exports that 
is really sensitive to domestic prices and wages is rather small. This particular composition of 
Greek trade explains why the two adjustment programmes failed to deliver. It was not because 
wages and prices did not adjust. Wages have already fallen by more than 20%, but exports 
have barely moved. The Greek economy is thus unlikely to benefit much from a further 
devaluation. 
The experience of Argentina is often adduced as evidence that devaluation can work 
wonders.  Indeed, Argentina experienced a sharp turnaround after its ‘Argexit’. But 
this happened because commodity prices started to increase at exactly that same time.  
The huge increase in grain prices, and that of oil, over the next few years paid for an 
extended period of increasing living standards and unorthodox economic policies. But 
all of this was due to a global commodity boom driven by demand from China.  The 
huge devaluation did not improve export performance; on the contrary. During the 
decade before the devaluation, real export growth had averaged 9%, whereas over the 
next decade it fell to only 3.3% although global trade growth remained close to 6%. 
                                                   
1 “How I would vote on Sunday if I were Greek”, Financial Times, 30 June 2015. 
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Moreover, there was no diversification in the structure of exports, which remain 
concentrated in commodities. In principle the devaluation should have stimulated the 
export manufacturing goods. But the share of manufacturing good in total exports 
remained at 10% even after the devaluation and has fallen today to only over 6%. 
Greece cannot hope for a similar lucky break as befell Argentina to help lift its economy out of 
the depths to which its financial system would plunge in the wake of an exit and breakdown. 
Many argue, however, that the tourism sector in Greece has been expanding even during the 
crisis and could be a key driver of future recovery.  
No doubt tourism is important for the Greek economy and when looking at certain indicators 
it appears that it has been expanding, but this may not be enough for salvation. 
Tourism receipts, which are recorded under ‘travel services’ in the balance of payment of a 
country, are Greece’s single largest export item, accounting for 22% of the total in 2014. 
Business travel is of only minor importance (representing less than 6% of total travel receipts 
in the last three years), whereas private leisure travel makes up to 85% (in 2014) of the total.  
In judging tourism receipts as recorded in the balance of payments, one has to keep in mind 
that they are estimated on the basis of the product of two numbers: the number of inbound 
travellers in Greece, mainly at the Athens international airport, and the spending per tourist, 
which is estimated from surveys distributed to arriving passengers.  
As the figure below shows, travel receipts in 2014 in nominal value were above the level of 
2008 (about €2 billion), but the increase is not striking. This performance is quite at odds with 
the impression given in numerous press reports of a tourism boom in Greece.  
Receipts by purpose of travel in Greece (€ billion) 
 
Source: Bank of Greece, Balance of Payment statistics. 
On explanation of why Greece’s (recorded) receipts have increased only moderately is that the 
(reported) spending of travellers per night has plummeted. As a tourist destination, Greece 
has not suffered from the crisis in the sense that the number of arrivals (and of overnight stays 
in hotels, hostels and other residences) has increased by about 50% since 2008 (see Panel a in 
the figure below). This is in stark contrast to the other peripheral countries where the number 
of overnight stays shrunk initially and then recovered relatively slowly. However, the 
spending per night has declined significantly, while in the other countries it has either 
increased or remained stable (Panel b)  
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Length of stay and expenditure by tourists in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, 2000-12 
Panel a: Number of nights spent by non-residents 
(2008=100) 
Panel b: Travel spending per night (€) 
  
Source: Eurostat. 
This is why overall the effect is smaller than one would have expected. In terms of their origins, 
tourists to Greece seems to be well diversified. Before 2011, nearly 50% of tourists were 
eurozone citizens for which exchange-rate movement are irrelevant. The share of eurozone 
citizens today has substantially shrunk to less than 40%, while the share of Russians has tripled 
from only 2.9% in 2009 to 9% in 2014. This implies that Greece has the ability to attract new 
tourists.  
Receipts by tourist origin, percent shares (2014) 
 
It remains to be seen whether tourism can really work as key driver of growth for the economy. 
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